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Black: Evidence--Admissibility of an Atheist's Dying Declaration

RECENT CASE COMMENTS
stronger than the presumption that they were guided by a dictionary.'
The court's method of interpretation might be justified, from
a practical standpoint, if its result were sufficiently desirable.
However, it does not seem that large repair shops used only
secondarily for storage, should be granted exemptions, and license
tax levies made on small storage buildings, rented indiscriminately
to the public. It appears that such would be the result of the
"dictionary-minded"
distinction drawn by the West Virginia
court.
-- JAcK C. BURDETT.

EVIDENCE

-

ADMISSIBILITY OF AN ATEoEmT's DYING DECAIARA-

TION. - In a murder prosecution, a question arose as to the admissibility of the dying declaration of an atheist.
The dying
declarant did not believe in any Supreme Being, or in any future
existence beyond death. He did not possess a belief in any form
of divine punishment or reward. The court relying on a statute
abolishing the requirement that a witness must testify under oath,
held the declaration admissible. Wtight v. Stae.1
The common law admitted dying declarations, within certain
limits, as an exception to the hearsay rule. It required that the
dying declarant possess a belief in God, in addition to a belief
that he was to die very soon. The courts felt that the gravity of
death under such circumstances was equal to the solemnity of an
oath in court as a guaranty of trustworthiness.
In the principal case the court recognized the common law
rule, but held that it was abrogated by the statute making an
atheist competent to testify.

It is clear that the statute cited by the court removed the
bar of atheism from the declarant's testimony and made him fully

competent to be a witness. There still remains, however, the problem of determining whether the dying declaration is sufficiently
C. Va. 1917); Wilkinson v. Mutual Saving Ass'n., 13 F. (2d) 997 (C. C. A.
7th 1926); Balanced, etc., Attractions v. Town of Manitou, 38 F. (2d) 28
(C. C. A. 10th 1930); Perrin v. Miller, 35 Cal. App. 129, 69 Pac. 426 (1917);
People v. Muldoon, 306 Ill. 234, 137 N. E. 863 (1922); Bohannon v. City
of Louisville, 193 Ky. 276, 235 S. W. 750 (1921); West v. Lysle, 302 Pa.
147, 153 AtL 131 (1931); Scott v. Doughty, 124 Va. 358, 97 S. E. 802 (1919);
Brown v. Robinson, 175 N. E. 269 (Mass. 1931).
2People v. Elliff, 74 Colo. 81, 219 Pac. 224 (1923).
1135 So. 636 (Ala. 1931).
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trustworthy to warrant its being admitted. The ease illustrates
the modern trend.' There is a feeling that all men hold death in
awe and experience a physical revulsion towards its unknown and
This the courts apparently are
unascertainable consequences!
willing to recognize, and rightly so, as sufficient assurance of
trustworthiness, without any requirement of a belief in God or
a hereafter.
There is some authority that the credibility of the dying
There
declarant may be impeached by a showing of atheism.'
would not seem to be any more valid reason for permitting a
showing of atheism to destroy credibility than to permit it to
Why admit a declaration
make the declaration inadmissible.'
only to leave it discredited by a clever lawyer playing upon the
religious prejudices of the jury?
-DONALD F. Br cx.

INJUNCTIONS - EQUITA3LE SERVITUDES - BOARDING HOUSE
AS "RESIDENCE PURPOSE". - In a suit to enjoin the operation of
a boarding house on property subject to a covenant limiting the
use to residential purposes only, the court, on appeal, dissolved the
injunction holding the operation of a boarding house not violative
of the covenant providing that "said land shall not be used otherwise than for residence purposes, and shall not be used for a
sanatorium, hospital or infirmary, and no apartment-house shall
be erected thereon". Beck, P. J., dissented vigorously on the
ground that both the spirit and the letter of the covenant were
violated. John Hancock Life Insurance Go. v. Davis
It is an elementary rule of law that covenants restricting
land should be strictly construed in favor of the free and untrammeled use of property.' The majority of the court, pur'State v. Hood, 63 W. Va. 182, 59 S. E. 971 (1907). State v. Williams,
36 Idaho 214, 209 Pac. 1068 (1922). People v. Lim Foon, 29 Cal. App. 270,
155 Pac. 477 (1915). State v. Yee Gueng, 57 Ore. 509, 112 Pac. 424 (1910).
Perry's Case, 3 Grat. 631 (1846). Hronek v. People, 134 Il. 139, 24 N. E.

861 (1890).

'2 WI GORE ON EVIDENCE (1904) § 1443.
'State v. Elliott, 45 Iowa 486 (1877). Nesbit v. State, 43 Ga. 238 (1871).
5As to this related problem note (1930) 9 N. C. L. Rev. 77.

1160 S. E. 393 (Ga. 1931).
2J ones v. Williams, 56 Wash. 588, 106 Pac. 166 (1910); Hutchinson v.
Ulrich, 145 Ill. 336, 34 N. E. 556 (1893); Be Walsh, 175 Mass. 68, 55 N. E.

1043 (1900).
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